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Viewing cable 08STATE128040, URGENT DEMARCHE TO GOA

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Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

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Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
08STATE128040	2008-12-04 21:34	2011-08-30 01:44	SECRET	Secretary of State

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.wikileaks.elfaro.net/es/201108/notas/5468/>

VZCZCXYZ0003
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHC #8040 3392140
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O P 042134Z DEC 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0000
RUEHBM/AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST PRIORITY 0000
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0000
RUEHSN/AMEMBASSY SAN SALVADOR PRIORITY 0000
RUEHTL/AMEMBASSY TALLINN PRIORITY 0000

S E C R E T STATE 128040

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2018
TAGS: [PREL](#) [PGOV](#) [MARR](#) [MOPS](#) [IZ](#) [ES](#) [RO](#) [AS](#) [EN](#)
SUBJECT: URGENT DEMARCHE TO GOA

REF: BAGHDAD 03794

Classified By: DAS G Davies for reasons 1.4 b and d

Summary

11. (S) Department requests that Embassy Canberra demarche the Australian Government on the way forward in the GOA's negotiations with the Government of Iraq on an agreement to permit Australian forces to remain in Iraq after the expiration of the UNSCR 1790 mandate for the multinational force. Please report GOA response, in particular any indication that the GOA will communicate with its mission in Baghdad. Info addressee posts should feel free to use points below as the basis of their own approaches to host government on this issue. Please slug replies for EAP/ANP, NEA/I, and S/I. End Summary.

Background

12. (S) As the GOI moves beyond the process of gaining agreement for the U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement, it is focusing on the terms for the continued presence of four Coalition partners (Australia, Romania, El Salvador and Estonia) beyond December 31. (The British are engaging with the GOI at the highest level and have made significant progress on a mechanism to permit them to stay in Iraq.) Regarding the other four, the GOI made clear its conditions for agreement: 1) that the Government will not present any more security agreements to the Council of Representatives (COR) and 2) that the forces of the four must conduct non-combat missions. The GOI is pressing for the simplest exchange of letters or diplomatic notes or signed MOUs to permit continued operations.

13. (S) The Australians have a high-level team in Baghdad and are working with the GOI but to date remain convinced that they need an agreement that would require COR approval. Given the importance of the Australian staff officers to MNF-I operations in Iraq, it would be most helpful for Embassy Canberra to press the GOA to look for a mechanism short of COR ratification to allow the continued presence of its military officers.

Points

14. (S/REL AS EN ES RO UK) Department suggests that the demarche be based on the following points:

--Now that the U.S. has concluded its complex negotiations with the GOI for a bilateral security agreement, the GOI is focused on negotiating terms to allow Coalition partners to remain in Iraq.

--The U.S. strongly supports the presence of Australian staff officers in MNF-I beyond January 1, 2009 and Australia's other significant contributions to Operation Iraqi Freedom.

--The GOI has made it clear that Australia's continued presence will be in a non-combat assistance capacity.

--PM al-Maliki has stated that he will not present any other bilateral security agreements to the COR.

--Canberra should explore whether there are other mechanisms that would allow Iraq to conclude a legally binding agreement without the approval of the COR. Such arrangements or agreement could be in the form of an exchange of diplomatic notes or a MOU, and draw upon relevant provisions in the U.S. Security Agreement with Iraq in order to establish a basis for the continued presence of Australian officers in Iraq.

Additional Point As Appropriate

15. If this remains an issue: We understand that the GOA wishes to include its combat forces in TF158 in its bilateral agreement. We recommend that this be addressed separately given the GOI's position against combat missions for coalition forces and that the GOA focus on a security agreement covering the Australian staff

officers embedded with MNF-I only.

Reporting Deadline

¶6. Embassy should report results of efforts by cable to the Department before December 12.

¶7. Please contact EAP/ANP's Aleisha Woodward or NEA/I's Shaun Mandelkorn for any necessary further background information or argumentation to meet our objectives.
RICE